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Child: State v. Koome

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Abortion • ParentalConsent • Minors' Rights to
Due Process,Equal Protectionand Privacy
State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975)

WHEN

Supreme Court, in 1973, broadly extended
Wwomen's right to abortion in Roe v. Wade1 and Doe v. Bolton, the
Court did not address itself to the constitutionality of state statutes requiring
parental consent for a minor's abortion. But it is in the wake of Roe and Doe
that the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Koome' has stricken that
state's consent statute.4
THE UNITED STATES

The Washington court had before it a physician appealing his conviction
for performing an abortion on an unmarried 16-year-old woman, a ward of
the King County Juvenile Court, which had given its consent to the abortion.
However, the young woman's parents and the Catholic Children's Services, her
temporary guardian, both opposed the abortion and were granted a stay of the
abortion order pending review by the state supreme court. During the stay,
Dr. Koome performed the abortion.5 The supreme court held that the
Washington consent statute "too broadly encumbers the right of unmarried
minor women to choose to terminate pregnancy, and unjustifiably discrimi1410 U.S. 113 (1973). A pregnant single woman (whose age is not given in the opinion)
brought this class action resulting in a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal
abortion law violated due process and the right to privacy. The law prohibited abortion
at any stage of pregnancy except to save the mother's life. The Court decided that:
(a) during approximately the first trimester the abortion decision should be made
according to the attending physician's medical judgment; (b) during approximately
the second trimester the state can regulate abortion procedure in the interests of the
mother's health; and, (c) only subsequent to viability can the state proscribe abortion
except to preserve the mother's life or health.
2 410 U.S. 179 (1973). A pregnant married woman (aged 22) brought this class action
resulting in a declaratory judgment that the Georgia criminal abortion law violated the
fourteenth amendment. The law, patterned after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962), proscribed abortion except to preserve the mother's
life or health, to abort a fetus likely to be born seriously defective, or to end a
pregnancy resulting from rape. To be permitted, an abortion required in addition, inter
alia, approval by a hospital abortion committee and confirmation of the attending
physician's decision by two independent physicians.
3State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
4 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.070 (Supp. 1970), which provided:
A pregnancy of a woman not quick with child and not more than four lunar
months after conception may be lawfully terminated... only: (a) with her prior
consent and, if married and residing with her husband or unmarried and under
the age of eighteen years, with the prior consent of her husband or legal guardian,
respectively....
5 84 Wash. 2d at 902, 530 P.2d at 262.
[1581
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nates between similarly situated groups of women in terms of their right to
obtain a legal abortion."'
It is important to consider that while Washington's statute was in effect
before the Roe and Doe decisions, comparable legislation was introduced in
other states following those decisions.' Even the statutes styled after the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code' require parental consent for an
abortion on an unmarried minor. What these statutes reflect, and what any
liberal law on abortion for minors must counter, is the firmly established
common law support for the family institution in general,9 and in particular
for the authority of parents over their children." The legal disabilities of
minors that in turn result are thus viewed as "privileges ... the object of the
law being to secure infants from damaging themselves ...by their own
improvident acts or prevent them from being imposed on by others.""
Courts have consequently seen fit to uphold a state's regulating the
participation of minors in a variety of activities that are considered legal for
adults. " That this distinction still thrives is clear in the Koome dissent," citing
the recent case of Ginsberg v. New York,' " which upheld a law using a
variable definition of obscenity as applied to materials sold to persons over
and under age 17.
A further justification for requiring parental consent, the one on which
the lower Washington court had heavily relied in convicting Dr. Koome, is
"the assurance of an adequately reflective and informed decision on the part
of the minor woman."'" This too is consistent with the common law
requirement of the parent's consent for any medical treatment," a requirement
designed to protect the minor because she is assumed unable to decide
rationally. 7 The parental consent theory ignores, or at least refuses to rely
6Id. at 903, 530 P.2d at 262.
7E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-58.5.2(a)(2) (Supp.
(May 3, 1973); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-7

1973); NEv. LAWS 1973 ch. 766
(Supp. 1973); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-7-304(4) (Supp. 1973). See Analysis: Nearly 200 Abortion Bills Introduced in
FAM. PLANNING/Pop. REP. 54 (1973).

1973, 2

MODEL PENAL CODE

"

§ 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

9 Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).

l In re Agur-Ellis, 10 Ch. D. 49, 71-72 (1878); 2

KENT, COMMENTARIES

203, cited in,

J. MADDEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 446 (1931).

"I Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798, 803 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
12Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
13 84 Wash. 2d at 918, 530 P.2d at 271.
'1
'5

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
84 Wash. 2d at 906-07, 530 P.2d at 264.

16 Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
17 The consent requirement is also technically designed to protect
the physician from tort
liability. Id. at 121, 122. But see Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 880, 484 P.2d 1345,
1350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1971). The Koome court also notes that a competent physician
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/7
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upon, the physician's legal duty to ascertain that any patient gives informed
consent to any medical treatment."8
In striking down Washington's restrictive legislation, the Koome court
followed liberal trends in two areas of litigation-sexual freedom for adults
and the extension of minors' rights-as well as enlightened social policy.
The recent liberal holdings on sexual freedom, including but not restricted
to abortion, have relied on three constitutional principles: due process,
privacy, and equal protection.
In both Roe and Doe the fourteenth amendment was controlling. The
Roe decision held:
A state criminal abortion statute.., that excepts from criminality only
a life saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to
pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved,9
is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Doe decision, handed down the same day as Roe, held "that the...
requirements as to approval by the hospital abortion committee [and] as to
confirmation by two independent physicians... are... violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment." 2" From these two statements the Washington court
broadly concluded: "The Roe and Doe decisions held that state statutes which
denied or conditioned the right of adult women to choose abortion were
1
inadequately justified, and consequently violative of due process." Again
citing Roe,22 the court also addressed the essential question "whether the
statute's abridgment of fundamental rights is justified by some 'compelling
state interest' which it furthers. If it is not its impact constitutes a violation
of due process."2 "
The "fundamental right" at issue is privacy; the strongly worded, but
not very detailed, references to due process may be included to shore up
what some consider an unsettled right. The dissent in Koome reflects this
performing most types of surgery on a consenting minor in fact runs little risk of civil
liability for lack of a parent's consent. 84 Wash. 2d at 913, 530 P.2d at 268, citing,
Pilpel, Minors' Rights to Medical Care, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 462, 466 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Pilpel].
Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 883, 484 P.2d 1345, 1350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8
(1971); Note, Minors and Contraceptives: The Physician's Right to Assist Unmarried
Minors in California,23 HAST. L.J. 1486, 1501-02 (1972).
18

19 410 U.S. at 164.
21

410 U.S. at 201.
84 Wash. 2d at 903-04, 530 P.2d at 263.

22

410 U.S. at 155.

20

84 Wash. 2d at 906, 530 P.2d at 264.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
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view when it notes that "the Supreme Court has been less than precise in
search of a basis for an individual's 'right of privacy.' "4
In principle, the right to privacy is not new. It was articulated long ago
by Mr. Justice Brandeis: "The makers of our Constitution ...conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 25 By the time of Roe and
Doe, with Griswold v. Connecticut " as the stepping stone, the right to privacy
had received fourteenth amendment sanction: "This right of privacy, whether
it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 2
The Court had already extended Griswold to unmarried adults: "If the right
of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."2 "
The Koome court was not even the first to extend abortion rights to
minors without parental consent on privacy grounds. The Florida consent
statute had already been struck down in the same year as Roe and Doe in the
case of Coe v. Gerstein, which held "that a pregnant woman under 18 years
of age cannot, under the law, be distinguished from one over 18 years of age
in reference to 'fundamental,' 'personal,' constitutional rights."3 The Koome
court relied heavily on Coe when it concluded that: "A demand for parental
consent, backed by the power of the criminal law of the state, is not necessary
and cannot be constitutionally justified." " This echoes the language used in Coe:
Certainly... parents ought to advise and guide their unmarried, minor
daughters in a decision of such import. But a state which has no power
to regulate abortions in certain areas simply cannot constitutionally grant
power to... parents to regulate in those areas. Therefore... parents cannot
look to the state to prosecute and punish the physician (or other participants) who performs an abortion against the wishes of the... parents."2
Id. at 919, 530 P.2d at 271.
25 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion). See also
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195, 198 (1890).
26 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (the right to privacy as applied to
24

contraception).

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
231376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 279 (1974); accord,
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1973); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339
(Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); In re P.J., 2 Fain. Planning/Pop.
Rep. 57 (D.C. Super. Ct. Fam. Div. 1973).
80 376 F. Supp. at 698.
3184 Wash. 2d at 909, 530 P.2d at 266.
27
28

32

376 F.Supp.at 699.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol9/iss1/7

4

Child: State v. Koome
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:1

The third constitutional principle often relied upon in extending sexual
rights is equal protection. When the Koome court held "that the distinctions
drawn between different classes of pregnant women in[Washington's consent
statute] violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,""
it specifically cited Eisenstadt v. Baird," which struck down analogous marital
status distinctions. The Koome court found in the Washington statute
...three discriminations: (1) between unmarried adult women seeking
abortions and similarly situated minors; (2) between married and
unmarried minors; and (3) between unmarried minors seeking
abortions, and others seeking other types of medical care. None of these
legal lines trace the contours of the asserted state justifications closely
enough to withstand equal protection scrutiny.3"
In addition to the liberal trend in areas of sexual freedom, the broadened
abortion rights for minors also stem from the extension of minors' rights
generally. "Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone," 3 said the Supreme Court in the landmark case, In re Gault,
increasing due process safeguards in the juvenile courts. The Court had, over
20 years earlier, acknowledged minors' first amendment rights by upholding
3
a child's right to keep silent during the pledge of allegiance. " Today the
leading case on freedom of expression under both the first and fourteenth
amendments is Tinker v. Des Moines,"s allowing students to wear black
armbands to protest United States participation in the war in Vietnam.
However, although these cases have begun the trend of broadening minors'
rights, they are not privacy cases, not even medical cases.
On the other hand, there have long been recognized exceptions to the
common law consent doctrine for medical treatment in general, such as
emergencies, emancipation or marriage of the minor, judicial decrees,3" and
a rule adopted by some courts excepting " 'mature' minors even if they are
not emancipated."" ° Many states now have statutes relaxing the parental
consent doctrine, but whether or not they extend such language as "care
1
related to pregnancy" to include abortion is often ambiguous. Ultimately,
3

84 Wash. 2d at 909-10, 530 P.2d at 266.

405 U.S. at 447, 450-5 1. See also Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
34

26-30 (1972).
3584 Wash. 2d at 910, 530 P.2d at 266.
36 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
37 West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
39 Pilpel, supra note 17, at 464-65.
40 Id. at 466. See also MIss. CODE ANN. § 7129-81 (Supp. 1971). See generally the table
of statutes on treating minors without parental consent in Pilpel, supra note 17, at 472-87.
41 Such legislation is analyzed in Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305, 311-13 (1974).
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
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it appears that the constitutional principles expand more rapidly by case law
than by legislation.' 2
A further reason the courts have responded more and more favorably to
women's-including minor women's-pleas for liberal abortion laws is the
evidence piling up on judges' desks of the physical, psychological, and social
problems that are exacerbated by restrictive abortion laws.'" There is evidence
in the Roe and Doe opinions that at least some justices pay attention to such
documentation." The Koome court also shows awareness of these problems.' 5
The statistics on the physical dangers of childbearing differ somewhat
depending on the study,' 6 but it is easy to conclude from them that abortion
in early pregnancy is safer than childbirth.' 7 The teenager's pregnancy and
childbirth are especially risky at nearly all stages, for both mother and
child.'" If the unmarried teenage mother and her child do survive the birth
physically intact, the social and psychological problems of both produce
a dismal narrative, often beginning with the mother dropping out of school
and ending with a neglected or abused child.' 9
42

Even before relaxing the law on abortion, Washington had allowed a minor to be

permanently sterilized without parental consent. Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 431

P.2d 719 (1967). Since the effects of that operation on the patient are likely to be far
more radical than those of an abortion, it is at least possible to speculate about a
subsequent line of cases allowing other types of medical treatment not essential to
preserve life, such as cosmetic surgery, orthodontic treatment, and a wide variety of
other both surgical and non-surgical procedures.
E.g., see the heavily documented briefs amicus curiae favoring legalized abortion
submitted to the Supreme Court in Roe and Doe, in 4 LAW REPRINTS, No. 3 (Criminal
43

Law Series, 1972/1973 Term).

"E.g., 410 U.S. at 153; 410 U.S. at 216-17.
84 Wash. 2d at 905, 530 P.2d at 263.

45

The maternal death rate from legal abortion in New York after legalization in 1971
was 3.7 per 100,000 abortions, less than half of the death rate for live deliveries.
46

PLANNED PARENTHOOD FED'N OF AMERICA, THE NEW YORK ABORTION STORY 22 (1972).

Hawaii had no reported maternal deaths from any of the 3,643 legal abortions performed
the first year after liberalized abortion legislation. UNIV. OF HAWAII, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE: ABORTION IN HAWAII: THE FIRST YEAR 7 (1971). The New York infant
mortality rate in 1971 was the lowest ever recorded in that state, 18.7 per 1,000 live

births. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, REPORT ON INDUCED ABORTIONS RECORDED
IN NEW YORK STATE JANUARY-DECEMBER, 1971 1-2 (Aug. 1972).
t

' Tietze, Mortality with Contraception and Induced Abortion, 45 STUD. IN FAM.
(giving maternal mortality rate for therapeutic abortion of three per
100,000 in contrast to the maternal mortality rate for pregnancy and childbirth at 20
per 100,000).
,s Anderson, Jenss, Mosher & Richter, The Medical, Social and Educational Implications
of the Increase in Out of Wedlock Births, 56 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1868, 1869 (1966).
4 Beck, Abortion: The Mental Health Consequences of Unwantedness, in ABORTIONCIANGING VIEWS AND PRACTICE 53, 57-62 (R. Sloane ed. 1971); M. LaBarre, The
Triple Crisis: Adolescence, Early Marriage and Parenthood, Part I-Motherhood, in
PLANNING 6 (1969)

NAT'L COUNCIL ON ILLEGITIMACY, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY, THE TRIPLE CRISIS-ILLE-
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6

Child: State v. Koome
[Vol. 9:1

AKRON LAW REVIEW

There is a further point to consider. Many a young unwed but pregnant
woman will get an abortion rather than have that narrative tell her life
story, whether the law gives her permission or not. Without the medical
safeguards that legal abortion provides, the dangers of self-induced and
5
illegally obtained abortions are staggering; " not only is the mortality rate
51 but so also is the rate of adverse side
much higher than for legal abortions,
3
effects, including both serious disease 5" and permanent sterility.
The Koome court, although not the first to do so, has taken a major step to
ameliorate this more than dismal situation. The remaining question, of course,
is whether Koome will serve to induce other states to strike remaining restrictive legislation, or whether, in spite of its liberal holding, the opinion will
provide other states with a method for saving such legislation. Not only does
Koome indicate that carefully drafted legislation can enable efficient juvenile
courts to intervene when parents capriciously refuse consent to a pregnant
minor in serious physical need of an abortion,54 but the majority also implicitly
recommends keeping the legislation but softening it to require only parental
consultation rather than consent. 5 Further, in support of this proposition, the
court cites Coe v. Gerstein,5 the Florida case removing a consent provision.
What the consultation scheme ignores, however, is that the unmarried
pregnant teenager is likely to have strong reasons not to tell her parents of her
pregnancy in the first place. If this is so, forcing her to consult them before
obtaining an abortion invades her privacy scarcely less than forcing her to
obtain their consent; it is also just as likely to lead her to criminal abortion
or the exacerbated dangers of childbearing. Her best interests would
often be better served by encouraging her to consult a physician pursuant
to an abortion involving the physician's professional judgment and the
patient's informed consent.57
GITIMACY TODAY 11 (1969); Schwartz, Abortion on
THE LAW 139, 158 (F. Walbert &J. Butler eds. 1973).

Request, in

ABORTION, SOCIETY &

50

N. LEE, THE SEARCH FOR AN ABORTIONIST 78-102 (1969).
r1 Hall, Commentary, in ABORTION AND THE LAW 228 (D. Smith ed. 1967).
52 Reid, Assessment and Management of the Seriously Il Patient Following Abortion,
199 J.A.M.A. 805 (1967).
ROMMER, STERILITY: ITS CAUSE AND ITS TREATMENTS 59 (1952).
.,3
.1484 Wash. 2d at 905-06, 530 P.2d at 264 (and stressed by the dissent).
.Id. at 909-10, 530 P.2d at 266, 268.

376 F. Supp. at 699.
-" Nowhere does the Koome court distinguish between the 16-year-old who gave rise to
56

the case and younger females. A court wanting to make that distinction in order to retain
the parental consent requirement for a younger female could point out that the MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) defines felonious intercourse as
"illicit intercourse with a girl below the age of 16." In § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962) reasonable mistake as to age is given as a specific defense to the charge of
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1976
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If other states recognize that both the minor's and the community's best
interests would be served by relaxing parental control, 8 especially in a
situation which inherently suggests that the parents have already lost control,
other courts can look to Koome to sustain the propositions that "parental
prerogatives.., are not absolute and must yield to fundamental rights of
the child or important interests of the State"5 and that "the State's interest
in restricting minors' access to abortions [is] inadequate to satisfy the
requirements of due process under Roe and Doe."6
Ultimately, since the right to privacy is not yet consistently applied to
minors, the courts will forge ahead on more solid ground if they strike down
the restrictive consent statutes for violations of due process and equal
protection; however, these very violations are more amenable to further
corrective legislation than are violations of the right to privacy. The former
violations have more to do with procedural matters of implementation while
the latter are substantive, going to the essential purpose of the statutes.
Consequently, it is possible that if conservative legislatures learn from Koome
and other similar cases to correct the due process and equal protection
violations, the trend may reverse. With only their unsettled privacy right to
protect them, minors could easily lose the stronghold ostensibly won in Koome.
BARBARA CHILD

rape except when the female is under 10. However, if coitus would be dangerous to such
a young child, presumably child-bearing would be even more so.
58
Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 880, 484 P.2d 1345, 1350, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6

(1971).
5 84 Wash. 2d at 907, 530 P.2d at 264.
(Io Id. at 909, 530 P.2d at 266.
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